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Perceptiony Influence, and Weapons Proliferation m
South Asia— Summary of Report (Contract #1722-920184)
Stephen P Cohen, University of Illinois at Urbana 
August 20, 1979
This report 1) examines South Asian attitudes towards defense and security policy,
2) the structure of the Indian defense policy process, 3) the likely reaction of India 
to a variety of nuclear-related events— especially the nuclearization of Pak-stan—  
and 4) suggests some paths for American policy
1) The prevalent image of regional vulnerability indicates that Indians and Pakistanis 
regard their security environment as basically hostile, although there is considerable 
disagreement within India as to where the chief threat comes from— Pakistan, China,
or even the U S A  Indians have now come to believe m  a positive relationship 
between economic development and military power Pakistanis distrust the consequences 
of an open or democratic political system, and Indians tend to believe that they can 
not have a sound relationship with Pakistan until it adopts such a system Relations 
between these two states are still influenced by communal or religious passions, which 
make it hard for them to trust each other, but there are signs that the role of 
communalism as a factor m  foreign policy is declining Finally, elites of both 
states, who have experienced a number of wars, tend to regard military hardware m  a 
strong positive light and ¡judge outside powers primarily on their role as weapons 
suppliers Nuclear weapons have not been carefully evaluated m  either country, but 
most political and military elites tend to view them as extensions of conventional 
weapons even as they call for global denuclearization
2) There is a basic consensus among the Indian elite that the nuclear weapons option 
must be kept open for future recalculation of gains and losses A few groups or 
individuals (such as the Gandhians) that would otherwise oppose nuclear weapons
-escribe to this Recalculation Option many strongly pro-bomb groups (such as the 
Jana Sangh some of the nuclear scientists, and elements of the socialists and 
Congress party) also agree to it It has received strong support from the military 
most centrist politicians, much of the Defense and External Affairs bureaucracy, the 
informed I-^ian public, civilian strategists, and the elite ¡journalist corps The 
Recalculation Option is likely to lead to a military program when Irdia has mastered 
the necessarv techrolog-.es, which will be m  several years A limited Indian 
mil \ t m  \ h 'iovelopment oc a strategic system capable cf reachmc ai-
of China (the Triggering Option)— is a possibility if certain dramatic events occur 
in the near future
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3) Indian reactions to a Pakistani explosion^ whether or not it was declared to be
peaceful' , would most likely be a military program of its own, possibly with some
delay in public declaration Evidence of preparations for an explosion would also be 
likely to trigger an Indian military program There is contradictory evidence as to 
whether India has already committed itself to such a program In neither case is 
an out of the blue' attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities likely, although this 
could occur in the course of a general war between the two states A stagnant 
Pakistani program would relieve pressure on India to quickly acquire a military 
program although it would not remove long term incentives (these include a concern 
with China, the status and prestige to be derived from a sophisticated system, and 
the leverage it would provide m  dealing with the superpowers as well as smaller 
regional states) India is likely to go nuclear by the end of the next decade but 
a Pakistani nuclear program would accelerate Indian plans and change the nature of 
the program
If the region goes nuclear then it will enter into a period of considerable 
instability There is not much understanding of deterrence theory m  either state 
tne command and control arrangements in Pakistan may not be effective the effects of 
nuclear weapons are not fully understood in either state a larger Indian program 
(50+ weapons) would begin to affect the Sino-Soviet nuclear balance, and the Soviet 
Union might reconsider its policy of opposing Indian nuclear acquisition However 
the Chinese would be presented with new opportunities to renegotiate their territorial 
dispute with an India that was no longer under the Soviet nuclear umbrella
4) The region is likely to be nucleanzed If the U S cannot or will not deal 
with some of the basic problems of national insecurity which lead to nuclear programs 
it should quickly dissociate itself from the nuclearization process However, if non­
proliferation (or control of proliferation) remains a high priority then there is no
1 ve but to encourage the slowly forming mini-detente between India and Pakistan,
and urge these two states to discuss their mutual security problems There are a 
number of American resources it can selectively provide weapons which help stabilize 
the conventional defense policies of Doth states the U S can encourage Ch^na to 
settle tT e beraer conflict with India Pakistan has no real choice but to continue to 
’-ely ur-on -t erica as a patron
Fegardless of which policy the U S pursues it can attempt to influence the Dace 
and outcome of the proliferation process by impressing upon the leadership of India and 
Pakistan the d-ff^culty of managing a nuclear deterrent system In particular these 
elites only aimly perceive the physical effects of nuclear weapors, and the regional 
d oliticai consequences barely at all
PERCEPTION, INFLUENCE, AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION
IN SOUTH ASIA
This report is divided into two parts Part I, Image and Perception, 
examines some of the major images of security and insecurity which shape 
regional security policies, and notes the way m  which these images are 
held by key elites with the policy process Part ll,Pj:ocess, Reactions,
Policy, attempts to predict the likely Indian reactions to certain 
major nuclear-related events, the regional strategic consequences, and 
suggests some alternative policies available to the United States
PART I IMAGE AND PERCEPTION
We have found it useful, as a complement to an analysis of regional 
strategic and proliferation problems, to examine in some depth a number of 
"image clusters" linked assumptions and images of the regional strategic 
environment held by South Asian elites The image clusters that we shall 
discuss include
— the sense of regional and national permeability held by South Asian 
elites,
— the linkage they make between military power and economic development 
— the importance of particular forms of government,
— the pervasive influence of communal attitudes in Indo-Pakistan relations, 
--perceptions of the importance of modem weapons, including nuclear 
weapons
These image clusters together do not constitute an 'operational code 
for policy makers in Islamabad or New Delh^, but their examination does 
contribute to sui understanding of the richness and complexity of regional
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security problems Further, at several points there do seem to be linkages 
between such images and the predisposition of regional elites to subscribe 
to particular strategies The following section of this Report draws 
upon a larger study of these image clusters, and is therefore not exhaustive 
It should, however, demonstrate the diversity and intensity of some widely 
held images and the degree to which they support certain strategic 
inclinations
A Soft States m  a Hard World
An important series of images and perceptions, widely held m  South 
Asia, is that the region as a whole— -or individual states in the region-- 
are especially susceptible to manipulation or penetration by outside forces 
The fragility or vulnerability of the region is, according to this view, 
a strategic fact of life
The particular Indian image of regional vulnerability has two components
with linked strategic consequences The first is that of the vulnerability
of the smaller states of South Asia to both internal disorder and external
penetration To some degree (especially in the case of Pakistan) some
internal instability is strategically useful, but m  others (such as
Afghanistan) it can lead to external involvement or even spread to India
A\ middle-rank Indian Foreign Service officer who has specialized m  South
Asian affairs makes the argument in these terms
I don't worry about a Pakistani attack on us, or even a joint 
Pakistan-China attack we are now much better equipped than 
before and can defend ourselves m  that way No, what really 
worries ne about Pakistan is that it is still tied into our 
m — rnal weaknesses in so many ways There is, of course, 
the problem of cur Muslim population, and the temptation of 
Pakistan for them I think they are loyal, but we must learn 
to treat them better Then there 1^ Kashmir, and a live tern- 
^ I  ^ n  \v Ueh also irvolves a l^rge Musl-ir copulation
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But finally there -s also the question of se aratism in the Indian 
states This applies North and South What if the Indian union 
*ere to be m  trouble’ What would Pakistan do’ More importantly, 
vvhat kind of example are they for our own separatists’ Taking 
’akistan back in would be worse, but there will always be 
problems with a separate Pakistan 2
■'uch of the same argument could be applied to Bangladesh, Nepal, 
and Sri Lanka These are states with ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
oroups m  India disorder m  any of these states can echo in India (and, 
as Indians tend to forget, vice versa)
A variant of the Indian image of regional penetration sees India 
itself as a target of external manipulation, both directly and indirectly 
t-rough foreign support of its neighbors 3 Thus, regimes which are both 
capable and under the influence of foreign outside powers can present a 
nagor threat to India hitherto only Pakistan has fallen into this category 
although there have always been profound Indian concerns over the penetration 
into Nepal of Chinese influence The 1978 revolution m  Afghanistan has 
been perce.ved with a great deal of ambivalence because, while the penetration 
into the region of an outside power is resented, the Soviet Lmo n  is 
seen as having legitimate interest m  the stability of Afghanistan and is 
also thought to be more responsible — i e sensitive to India's security 
concerns— than either the U S  or Chira
■’’hus, any attempt by Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan or Bangladesh to 
invite outside powers into the area has usually been seen by most Indians 
as a threat to the concept of a region free of outside interference 
And when such a connection is military m  character it is also assumed to 
have anti-Indian implications While there is considerable bluster and not 
a small degree of looking the other way m  Indian criticisms of American
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naval involvement in the Indian Ocean, for example, the vehemence and persis­
tence of such criticism is based upon a genuine fear of regional vulnerability 
(exacerbated by India's relative incapacity to do much about it) The 
sailing of the U S S Enterprise was the ultimate in symbolic insult, and 
drove India's fear of regional penetration to new heights just at the 
moment of its greatest political and military triumph Eight years after 
it occurred, the Enterprise episode is invariably raised m  discussions 
with Indian strategists, journalists, and members of the foreign policy 
community It had a major impact on military thinking and contributed 
directly to the present expansion program of the Indian Navy Above all, 
it is remembered as a nuclear as well as military threat
This image of regional vulnerability has existed among Indian elites 
for many years it can be detected in the manifestos of various nationalist 
movements, including the Congress party, as early as the turn of the 
century It was reinforced by a series of traumatic military conflicts, 
most notably the 1962 war with China, the second war with Pakistan (1965) 
and the 1971 weir over the liberation of Bangladesh It is widely, if not 
universally held among Indian elites in the military (who cure, after all, 
professionally trained to suspect the worst), civilian bureaucrats, political 
elites, and the press and informed public And because of the bitter 
experiences these elites and publics have had in dealing with some outside 
powers, they have become more, rather than less suspicious of the U S and 
China m  the past two decades Both are widely if not universally 
criticized for continuing their 'interference'' m  regional affairs (i e 
many Indians feel that neither has yet fully acknowledged India's regional 
hegemony and altered their policies accordingly) Indian attitudes
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towards the United States m  this regard should be familiar to the reader,
out their images of the Chinese may not
Indian images of China are not based upon extensive or close cortact
except for a contrived period of ' H m d i - C h i m , Bhai Bhai' ' After the 1962
conflict the Chinese came to be viewed as fanatic, brutal ideologues, and
Indian imagery of China closely resembled that held by many Americans
during and after the Korean war The unpredictable behavior of the Chinese
also upset Indian military and security elites 4 Two years after the 1962
war, Lt Gen B M Kaul (the one Indian Army officer with substantial
experience m  dealing with the Chinese in both Korea and China) could still
ask a visitor for a coherent theory of why the Chinese had attacked 5
Even for Nehru, the Chinese were 'a mystery ' According to T N Kaul
(the former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador to the U S ) Nehru felt that
It is difficult to know what is in their mind They smile while 
saying the most callous and ruthless things Mao told ne with 
a smile that he was not afraid of an atomic war The Soviet 
leaders are not isolated like the Chinese leaders Their reactions 
are predictable but with the Chinese you never know and
have to be prepared for unexpected reactions This may be partly 
due to their isolation but it is mainly the Chinese character 
I think 6
For many Indians the Chinese attitude of superiority make them insufferable 
Even worse, they were able, to edge out the Indians m  the minds of both 
the superpowers and the rest of the Third World, by the 1962 military 
victory, their nuclear weapons program, and an unmatched skill at ob;jurgation
With the exception of a very small group of officials, journalists, 
and some politicians there is little support m  India for negotiations 
with China over the Smo-Indian border dispute This will continue as 
long as the dominant perception of China as a strategic threat survives 
China's support of Pakistan, the Nagas, and other regional dissident
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groups in India, real or imagined, is widely seen as an absolute barrier 
to further discussions, not as a device to influence those discussions 
And as long as many Indian elites regard India and China as inevitable 
competitors for influence m  all of Asia and the Third World^they will 
believe that adequate military power must be maintained to 
deter China from meddling m  South Asia itself For a number of politicians 
a nuclear umbrella from the U S S R  is inevitable only as long as it takes 
India to acquire its own nuclear capability to deter China At that 
time serious negotiation between the two Asian giants can take place
Two other points can be made about the widespread distrust of China 
prevalent among the Indian elite The first is that such distrust is 
subject to rapid change Because there has been so little contact with the 
Chinese, and because the Sino-Indian dispute is largely over wasteland 
and not territory of central importance to India, each tentative contact 
between the two governments has raised expectations about the settlement 
of disputes between the two states If serious negotiations were to take 
place and were to result in a settlement which could be interpreted as 
having redeemed the lost honor" of India (particularly of the military) 
they might receive considerable public support Secondly, some of the 
public distrust of China may be sincere, but it also serves a useful 
political purpose Individuals and groups who vish to maintain high 
defense levels (including the development of nucleair weapons) cannot 
justify such a policy solely m  terms of Pakistan Not only is this 
strategically ludicrous, but it also has communal implications which 
many politicians would like to avoid However, China can be targeted 
as a strategic threat with no domestic political costs, and this also 
reassures India's major external weapons supplier, the Soviet Union
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B Domestic Sources of National Insecurity
Several major image clusters are based upon the assumption of a 
direct link between external policy and internal, domestic considerations 
Here the argument is either that external policies should pursue values 
generated within the state, or that domestic compulsions necessarily 
dominate foreign policy  ^ We will examine three such images and perceptions 
and their implications for regional security The first is the relationship 
between poverty and national agendas, the second the relationship between 
state structure and national security, and the third the linkage of communal 
conflict and foreign policy
1 Scarcity, Security, and Self-Reliance
If there is one image of South Asia that crowds out all others m  
the developed world's collective imagination it is that of desperate 
poverty For many, South Asia has come to stand as a metaphor of human 
degradation with such places as Calcutta representing a close approximation 
of Hell Images of the starving child, the bloated corpse, the begging widow, 
are all familiar to the point of being cliches Poverty on this scale 
implies a single, moral imperative remove it Any policy or act is 
justified if it contributes to the amelioration or elimination of such 
poverty any policy which perpetuates it or which does not contribute to 
the elimination of poverty is immediately suspect
Jawaharlal Nehru certainly believed this and only reluctantly agreed 
to an expansion of the Indian armed forces just before the Sino-Indian 
war of 1962 Lt Gen B M Kaul, at that time a confidant of Nehru, 
recalls the latter shouting to a group of generals 'You want more gunsl 
Wveie «tAiAing in India! should we aive more nonev to f-ght
g
war with*! ' But Nehru gave in, and his physical and political decline 
as a result of the disaster of 1962 has served as an object lesson to even
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his most unwarlike successors While there are some m  South Asia who 
hold that the government allocates too much to defense, there are more 
who see the issue from a quite different perspective They recognize the 
absolute and relative poverty of their states on various measures and indices 
They do not deny the existence of hunger, high death rates, and a relatively 
low per capita GNP However, for these elite groups the presence of 
such poverty does not imply the subordination of security and defense 
expenditures to developmental programs nor, for some, does it imply a 
necessary correlation between high defense expenditures end low growth 
rates K Subrahmanyam, a senior I A S  officer, has taken the lead in 
popularizing this view
The view of defense and development being mutually exclusive 
alternatives is popular m  the academic world m  India as well 
as abroad Western academicians have had more success in convin­
cing Indian scholars than m  persuading their own governments 
of the truth of such theses' Twenty years of fixed ideas
have convinced a whole generation of bureaucrats, academicians 
and even military men m  this country that defense expenditure 
should be kept down to a minimum Defense against mosquitoes, 
plague [or] rehabiliting 'fallen women' is legitimate plan 
expenditure because it is social defense, but defense of the g 
country against external threats is non-plan expenditure
Subrahmanyam and others formulate the problem differently, in terms of
scarcity and self-reliance They see their nation as rich and powerful
m  certain resources unskilled and skilled manpower, raw materials, and a
sense of national purpose and identity which does not exist m  most other
new nations For them, especially m  India, their countries are not poor
but quite wealthy, and it is only a question of pulling the right economic
and strategic levers so as to maximize existing resources
Thus, for many m  South Asia the relationship between poverty and external 
policy (including military spending) is surrounded by a different set of 
images than for their Western or Japanese counterpart Even before Nehru, 
industrial might was closely correlated with military might, m  turn this
-9-
is seen as essential to protect the autonomy of new nations while economic 
development remains the chief goal of the state^ national security is thought 
to be a necessary condition for achieving that goal Further, there are 
those such as Subrahmanyam who have argued that there is a positive relation­
ship between defense spending and economic growth, and who urge a defense-led 
strategy of development 10
While such arguments are relatively new in the region, they 
spring from the same source as Nehru's antipathy to high defense budgets 
This is the vision of "self-reliance", which is less of a policy than a 
desired state of existence, m  which policy makers (and through them, the 
nation) are liberated from economic or military bondage to others The only 
difference between Indian and Pakistani or Bangladeshi approaches to self- 
reliance is that m  the former state there is some hope of at least partial 
autonomy in major economic and industrial sectors, for Pakistan or Bangladesh 
there is very little
This vision of self-reliance is critically linked to security policy 
at every turn Calculations of the duration of wars in the subcontinent are 
based not only on judgements about the ability of the economy to provide 
certain kinds of weapons, ammunition, and P 0 L supplies, but on the 
anticipated cut-off of such supplies by external powers The military m
both India and Pakistan continually estimate the likely inflow of weapons 
from the outside and attempt to build their own weapons inventories to meet 
and defeat not only the enemies'existing weapons, but all weapons which 
— 3ht be delivered prior to or during a war And they are not only concerned 
witn military supplies but with manipulation from sources of food, energy, 
and even capital From the perspective of outsiders, especially the super-
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powers, this can be a form of arms control but m  New Delhi or Rawalpindi 
it is a knife at the throat
Decisions concerning the indigenous production of weapons are also
heavily influenced by judgements about their contribut-on to self-reliance
If a weapons system can be linked with broader, economic capabilities
(leading to increased autonomy) it immediately becomes more acceptable to
a wide range of public opinion During the Indian debate over acquisition
of a "deep penetration strike aircraft' (DPSA) a senior government official
made this point quite eacplicitly
We are not worried about Pakistan's Mirage [referring to ore 
of the main arguments put forth by DPSA supporters] Our con­
cern is the long-run, and the acquisition of the technologies 
which would make us increasingly self-reliant, and some day 
we will reach the point where we can make our own 'DPSA'
That's why we are buying the Jaguar, not because of any 
present military threat We need that aircraft to keep our own 
industry alive H
This is true of both conventional and nuclear weapons, and public support 
for the nuclear programs m  India and Pakistan is in part due to the early 
and sustained links between nuclear programs and economic self-reliance 
forged in the minds of nearly all politically attentive regional elites 
In both states a popular and widespread image is that of peaceful nuclear 
programs which have enormous technological and economic benefits, and 
which contribute to national self-reliance
It is hard for many in the West to grasp this because they are over­
whelmed by the problem of poverty in the Subcontinent Regional elites are 
not overwhelmed by it they have come to political maturity and power m  
societies which are— m  relative terms, poor— but which for them are filled 
with resources, assets, and opportunities This is not to imply that 
attitudes towards defense spending are promiscuous (especially in India)
The historic juxtaposition of the images of India as a desperately poor
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country with enorirous human and material resources has led to the development 
of an extraordinary security policy process No other developing country 
(and few developed ones) have such a thorough system of fiscal and political 
control over military-related decisions, especially m  the areas of force 
levels, weapons development and procurement In India there is a long and 
respected tradition of critical budgetary analysis within the bureaucracy 
and some political parties But the assumption that most South Asians are 
obsessed with heavy defense spending because of the high priority they 
assign to economic growth is false A strategy of growth plus security is 
favored (especially m  India) and there are hopes that m  the long run this 
is, if not the shortest, then the safest route to self-reliance
Finally, in both India and Pakistan, the idea of self-reliance m  military 
hardware, including nuclear weapons, is widely if not publicly linked to 
the domestic structure of power This is self-evident in Pakistan where any 
government must demonstrate that it is capable of ensuring a flow of modem 
weapons to the military It is also true in both states for a very different 
reason Modern weapons enhance the power and influence of the centralizers' 
the elites concerned about the diminution of power of the central government 
m  the face of demands for regional autonomy The military epitomize the power 
and prestige of the central government and represent the ultimate sanction 
against fissiparous ethnic, linguistic, or regional groups it is no coin­
cidence that elites who favor the enhancement of central authority also 
favor heavy industrial projects, nuclear programs, and relatively high defense 
spending levels these are elements m  a strategy of self-reliance although 
a auite different approach to it than that offered by India's incapacitated 
Gandhians Nuclear weapons are of particular value to the centralizers 
their use is not contemplated, but their possession is thought to confer
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overwhelming symbolic power upon those who have developed and control them 
they see nuclear weapons as devices which strengthen the hand of the central 
government against both internal dissidents and external powers
To summarize, it is clear that proposals for regional arms control or 
non-proliferation are not likely to be viewed wholly or even in large part 
from an economizing perspective Unless an economic catastrophe strikes 
one or more of the major regional states or there is a persistent and extended 
decline in their economic productivity, decisions concerning levels of defense 
spending are likely to be made m  terms of strategic, military, and political 
criteria
2 State Structure
A second set of images linking domestic factors to the shaping of external 
policy emphasizes the importance of state structure There is more concern 
over this in India than in Pakistan, and a more carefully articulated set of 
beliefs These are derived both from the liberal Western tradition of 
anti-militarism as well as Irdia's own post-independence experience
The essence of the Indian view has been for many years that a chief 
cause of war in South Asia is the domination of Pakistan by the military 
A military regime cannot adequately represent the ' true interests of the people, 
and is more likely to seek war to resolve international disputes as well 
as to distract attention away from its domestic failures
Complementing this distrust of the soldier is a strong Indian belief 
in the importance of following set procedures in reaching strategic and military 
decisions Sound strategies are derived from sound processes, and there is 
an enormous skepticism within India of those who try to break the routines of 
established civilian or military bureaucracies And above all, this belief 
stresses the importance of a powerful civilian leader, centered m  the office
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of the Prime Minister This support of a centralized foreign policy process 
has, as a corollary, a distrust of politicizing” security and foreign policy 
issues There is a widespread belief that Indian democracy is fragile enough 
without introducing divisive, extraneous foreign policy issues
Many Pakistani civilians and not a few in the military would agree
m  the abstract with this emphasis on civilian control through routmized
bureaucratic processes However, they also argue that for states under
siege, or whose territory is occupied by an alien power, normal civilian'
control is not feasible Pakistan, they claim, is such a state, and the
military of necessity will have a dominant voice m  strategic decision-
making As President Ayub Khan believed,
From the moment Pakistan came into being I was certain of one 
thing Pakistan's survival was vitally linked with the establish­
ment of a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led army I 
was determined to create this type of military shield 
Today I am convinced that without this army Pakistan could not 
have weathered the storms and attacks to which it was exposed 
and the army behind the people of Pakistan is still a sure 
guarantee that our enemies will not be able to weaken us 13
While a number of officers in Pakistan sincerely believe that a return to 
the barracks is necessary for both their professional well-being and the 
unity of Pakistan, many resist this and are tempted by the prospect of a 
permanent military role m  the political system These men see "the poli­
ticians' (and the diplomats) as too willing to compromise, to sell out 
hard-won battlefield victories, and unable to generate the kinds of internal 
and external support required by the military They believe, unlike most 
informed Indian (and some Pakistani opinion) that the complicated, pluralist 
state of Pakistan can be run by the military, or at least rim by them better
than the politicians
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These two sets of attitudes— India's distrust of military regimes, 
and the Pakistani military's suspicion of civilian ones— are further complica­
ted by the religious-ideological differences between the states For 
many Pakistanis the idea of democracy in the context of South Asia is 
repugnant, because it implies Hindu majorities and Muslin minorities 
Democracy among Muslims is another question (on which there is some room 
for disagreement), but there is no doubt that when it implies a minontv 
position for Muslims it is unacceptable The creation of Pakistan eliminated 
this threat (which is still perceived as such, as can be seen in the absence 
of any pan-Bengal movement among East Bengalis) However, Indian or outside 
suggestions that the nations of the region form a common political, economic 
or defense arrangement, or suggestions of either a multi-lateral (regional) 
or bilateral economic, political, or military arrangement are viewed with 
extreme distrust Not only because they might put Pakistan at a size 
disadvantage, but because they seem, to many Pakistanis, to be aimed at the 
very ethos or ideology of Pakistan In the words of a senior Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs official
Pakistan presents a problem not only to India, but to the Soviet 
Union, and they would both like to see the break-up of Pakistan 
continue They stand for secularism, linguistic, and cultural 
regionalism we stand for Islam They cannot dominate or change 
us, we stand m  the way of their [India] becoming the leader of 
the Third World I know we have trouble defining what 'Islam 
means in practice, I know we have trouble managing our own inter­
nal affairs, but in the end we stand for something quite different 
than they do, and our very existence is a challenge to them 14
What this official neglected to add, is that India's 'existence' as a
professedly secular state is no less a challenge to Pakistan itself
An enormous literature exists on this problem of competing or conflicting
national identities, much of it in relation to the Kashmir question, so
we need only point out some salient features of the issue
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The trauma of Partition generated the strongest feelings about lost 
territories and hostage populations m  both India and Pakistan Kashmir 
is a point of dispute between two states, but it is also a challenge to their 
se^ ~ 3jna9e Elites m  all regional states are extremelv sensitive to 
territorial disputes such as Kashmir, for in virtually every case what is 
at stake is not mere territory but identity This is no different than 
European sensitivities to territories and ’lost populations forjin the 
age of nationalism^borders assume more than economic or practical functions 
They are seen as lines which include not lines which exclude Indians 
regarded their state as the successor to the old British India, and that what 
remained would be integrated into a stable, strong, secular, and unified 
state Pakistanis saw ( m  1947) Kashmir as one of several states which
might secede from India on the basis of Muslim self-rule, m  or out of 
Pakistan For the Indian leadership a predominantly Muslim Kashmir could 
be incorporated into India for both strategic and ideological reasons 
(Kashmir was and is the key to the defense of Ladakh and India, and any 
determination of population accession on the basis of religion might well 
cause new instability among India's enormous Muslim population or other 
ethnic-religious minorities)
The Kashmir question has now resolved itself into the degree of Pakistani 
concern, as India possesses most of the state, including the strategically 
vital and symbolically determinative Valley India is a status quo power 
but Pakistani governments cannot or will not allow the issue to die 
There is some indirect evidence that general concern over Kashmir has declined 
in Pakistan but it may take years until that altered perception is absorbed 
m  official policy, no government m  Pakistan is likely to lead public
opinion in the direction of a settlement based upon anything like the status
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quo If anything, images of Kashmir are stronger and more hostile m
the higher reaches of government and the military than m  the rest of Pakistani 
society
These images of state type and identity have a direct relationship to 
the propensity of India and Pakistan to subscribe to an arms control regime 
Some images held by Indians and Pakistanis tend to downgrade what to many 
outsiders is the strongest motive for arms restraint, regional poverty 
Other images imply the pursuit of irrational, or symbolic objectives, or 
stress the inability of a military (or democratic) regime to pursue and abide 
by a peaceful regional settlement, at least m  the South Asian context 
And, finally, the question of Kashmir looms as an issue which raises the most 
profound anxieties over security, territory, and national identity m  both 
India and Pakistan
3 The Eidetic Image Communalism and Conflict16
A final image which links domestic and international politics m  South 
Asia can be termed the communal conflict with armor model It rests upon 
a belief that relations between regional states— especially India and Pakistan—  
are merely scaled up international versions of communal, religious, caste, 
or other domestic conflicts
The communal n o t  is a set-piece -n South Asian administrative history 
A conflict between two recognizable ethnic, religious, or linguistic groups 
erupts because of both proximate and long-term considerations Both sides 
not only battle each other, they must keep one eye on outside forces (the 
police, administrative officials, politicians) who may or may not plav favontes 
ara who may or may not act to speedily end the conflict The n o t  does end, 
but both parties are aware that it was only one episode m  a long-term struggle, 
and they prepare for the next round
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Many see in the wars between Irdia and Pakistan of 1947-48, 1965, and 
1971, a pattern resembling the communal n o t  while both states have conflicting 
relations with other neighbors, they appear to return again and again to each 
other As m  the riot, the causes of conflict between the two states run 
very deep and wars are thought to be as predictable as riots stemming from 
religious, linguistic, or caste hatreds Outsiders, such as the UN, the 
superpowers, and interested states can influence the outcome of the conflict 
but they cannot prevent it Nor can they be trusted, although they might be 
used
This image or model of Indo-Pakistan relations as a communal riot can 
be based upon one or more of three different assumptions At the crudest 
level it is motivated by a belief in the depravity of the other side 
The imagery here is notorious and vivid It includes sexual peculiarities, 
cow-worship Cor cow-eating), hot tempers, and ingrained duplicity What is 
of importance here is that when one side believes that the other is inherently 
evil or corrupt, the notion of cooperating or even negotiating with such 
a state is heresy The communalist will argue that such cooperation can only 
lead to the contamination and degradation of your own state
Secondly, the communal conflict model may rest upon a special inter­
pretation of South Asian history There are many m  (and outside) the region 
who feel that religious systems must necessarily shape international politics 
and it is historical destiny that a Muslim Pakistan and a Hindu India face 
each other across a hostile border Secularism' m  India is attacked by 
virtually all Pakistanis as a sham and by some Indians as well In fact, 
many Pakistanis argue, 'perhaps a conforming [i e orthodox] Hindu leader 
would have, m  time, found it easier to live with Pakistan on a nomai 
footing than did Jawaharlal Nehru, the exceptional [i e secular] Hindu
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Thirdly, there are many in the region who personally do not hold 
communal interpretations of regional relations^ but conclude that because 
so many others do,that Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Bangladesh relations will 
inevitably assume a communal tinge These pessimist-realists argue that 
most subcontinental conflicts originated m  Partition or axe a reprise of 
issues (such as the treatment of hostage minorities) which led to it 
They claim that only a few of these issues être amenable to negotiation 
and even then the politicians and volatile masses of the subcontinental 
states would disrupt arrangements This image is widely held by civil 
servants and soldiers in the regional states and is derived both from 
experience and the administrative traditions which have been handed down 
from the days of the British
An important strategic implication of the communal conflict image is 
that it supports both deterrent and action-reaction models of conflict 18 
In the short run an outburst of conflict is seen as a function of deterrence 
when one side becomes weak or relaxes its vigilance the other is likely to 
strike both sides must maintain a retaliatory or defensive capability to 
deter the eruption of conflict Concessions, trust and compromise carry 
great risk, except as they might lull the opponent into carelessness (a 
notion which implies the need to be vigilant against the day when the enemy 
will play a similar trick) Weakness invites pressure, negotiations can only 
take place from 'a position of strength ' However, since there is always 
some degree of uncertainty over enemy capabilities and immediate intentions, 
this ’position of strength' is always a vague and uncertain goal The 
requirements of deterrence are vague since the opponent is seen as motivated 
by communalist and emotional considerations Thus, although major urban 
areas have not been systematically attacked in recent Indo-Pakistan wars, 
some strategists in both countries suspect that in future conflicts— especially
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when and if nuclear weapons become available— the destruction of cities 
may enter into calculations of deterrence
Uncertainty over 'how much is enough' contributes to the assumption of 
the communal conflict image that the present is rooted m  a long history 
of violent attack and counter-attack, an action-reaction model Both Indians 
and Pakistanis emphasize the periodicity of their conflict and argue persua­
sively that the crushing defeat of Pakistan in 1971 was an aberration, and 
did not usher in a stable imbalance of power Those who hold the image of 
Indo-Pakistan relations as a communal n o t  tend to emphasize the historic 
inevitability of another conflict They argue that it cannot be contained 
by mere manipulations of the level of arms or the temporary acquisition of 
effective deterrent capabilities by one side or another This belief also 
contributes to the Indian idea and Pakistan fear of putting an 
end to the escalatory process should another conflict break out, and it 
provides an additional rationale for the shift m  Indian military planning 
to an "offensive-defense" after 1972 And, of course, there are a few on 
both sides who are attracted by the South Asian equivalent of lobbing one 
into the men's room of the Kremlin ' they have an apocalyptic vision of a 
future nuclear holocaust in which the other side can be damaged so severely 
that it is unlikely to ever seek conflict again
It is this element of unpredictability and uncertainty which is the 
most destabilizing contribution of the communal conflict with armor image 
In the end it leads one to ask not whether Indians or Pakistanis can be 
trusted to fulfil their obligations in an arrangement which lacked incentives 
for compliance, but whether, under the influence of a communal image of their 
relationship, they can be trusted m  cases where it was in their self-interest 
to comply
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C Weapons and War
Finally, it is important to summarize some of the widely held imacres
concerning weapons, strategy, arms acquisition, and nuclear weapons, especially
19those images held by the military in India and Pakistan
Unlike many other Third World states, there are in India and Pakistan 
both security-related as well as prestige-derived reasons behind the military's 
demand for modem weapons India and Pakistan have fought a number of wars 
and officers in both states clearly expect more conflict m  the future 
Modem weapons help to win a war— or at least help prevent losing it— and 
the military m  India and Pakistan share this concern with every other war­
fighting army But modern weapons are valued for very different but no less 
important reasons Both armies place a very high premium on trained manpower 
as a way of stretching scarce resources They are willing to accept less- 
than-latest technologies m  inadequate numbers However, there is a powerful 
feeling that shoddy or inferior equipment is unacceptable because it unnec­
essarily endangers the lives of the user, or unfairly tilts the odds against 
him even before the battle is joined This concern extends to both jawan 
and officer, from twenty rupee boots to one crore rupee aircraft the military 
is content to lag one or even two generations behind the latest NATO or 
Warsaw pact technology^ but after that point the calculated* risk is unac­
ceptable Whatever the attitudes of the rest of society, officers m  
India and Pakistan do not view the life of a highly trained and professional 
soldier as cheap' or expendable, and are shocked by the idea of human 
wave tactics They do not demand the latest weapons but they very strongly 
feel that they must not be deprived of reasonably contemporary military 
technology, given the high probability of warfare and the sacrifices they 
are already making for the sake of their nation
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The two military establishments also share some assumptions about the 
proper way to wage war in South Asia Pakistan's small size, its greater 
geographical vulnerability (especially the city of Lahore) and its access 
to Western military equipment encouraged its strategists to develop highly 
mobile forces capable of striking (either pre-emptively or m  retaliation) 
deep into Indian territory, and defeating India's armored forces Pakistanis 
cultivated a self-image of speed, power, and decisiveness, m  contrast with 
their image of an elephantine, clumsy and ill-equipped India Until 1965 
it was widely believed on both sides that Pakistani armor was more than a 
match for Indian ground forces the 1965 conflict demonstrated that this was 
no^ true and that the balance of armored power would slowly shift to the 
Indian side This m  turn (plus the lessons of the 1965 Middle East War) 
led Pakistan to develop a strategy of pre-emption, and after that failed m  
1971, Pakistan has unsuccessfully sought to redress an increasingly unfavorable 
military balance by considering deterrence strategies or restoring the con­
ventional arms balance with purchases of aircraft and tanxs abroad All 
of these efforts have been unsuccessful and the self-image of a small, 
hypercompetent David fighting off a large, clumsy Goliath has been severely 
shaken While many Pakistanis still proclaim their martial superiority, 
virtually all military experts acknowledge India's lead in hardware, tramirg, 
and manpower
The Indian military self-image has mirrored that of Pakistan For many 
years Indian strategists were obsessed with the qualitative superiority of 
Pakistani weapons, despite their own increasing competence India perceives 
^  a Dava-d* fending off a hostile China and America, who seek to use 
Pakistan as a cat's paw Thus, while confident of their newly acquired
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super i o n  ty over Pakistan,they are wary of Pakistan's allies This partly 
accounts for the obsession with arms transfers to Pakistan from the Middle 
East or the U S
In addition, India has had to incorporate the defeat of 1962 into its 
own military identity For many Indian Army officers, this defeat has not 
yet been "avenged" nor has its stain been wiped out' The lingering conflict 
with China thus contributes to the Indian image of survival m  a sea of 
hostility Pakistan and China as overt enemies, an unstable Nepal and 
Bangladesh each with cordial links to China, and America as an unpredictable 
factor
This uncertainty over the location of threat, and a multiplicity of 
potential enemies has some strategic utility for India The chief advantage 
is that while Indians may differ over threat perception, there is widespread 
agreement that there i£ a threat, and hence agreement on the maintenance of 
force levels and weapons quality Disagreements occur m  specific cases 
acquisition of particular weapons, allocation of the defense budget between 
the services, or the location and distribution of forces, but the managers 
of Indian security are generally able to smooth over such differences m  
public with the reminder that India is threatened from all sides
For both India and Pakistan the weapons acquisition process is more 
them an adjunct to strategic planning It constitutes an important cluster 
of symbols and images in its own right Modern weapons are associated by 
both Indians and Pakistanis with a history of domination and concruest 
of South Asia by Europeans The lack of such weapons (or the organizational 
skills to utilize them properly) is thought to be a clear sign of national 
backwardness Their acquisition is both a symbol and a measure of national 
achievement, for most South Asian elites,tanks, aircraft, and artillery 
have strong positive images
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There are also important political dimensions to weapons acquisitions 
In Pakistan weapons are regarded as not only vital to the continued existence 
of the state (vis a vis India), but as a measure of outside support, since 
Pakistan cannot manufacture any major weapons by itself Weapons provide the 
material proof of political allegiance and thus have meaning which transcends 
their lunediate tactical use
Indians share this view and tend to regard Pakistan's weapons suppliers 
as hostile However, weapons supplied to India aire viewed m  a different 
context, that of overall self-sufficiency and non-alignment Although to 
an outside observer there may be little difference, there is a widely held 
Indian belief that its suppliers are somehow possessed of a higher motivation, 
that such arms in Indian hands are not provocative, nor do they bring the 
Cold War" into the region in quite the same way that weapons bound for 
Pakistan do This would seem to be hypocritical, but it is consistent 
with the Indian self-image of an essentially peaceful, defensive, and non- 
aggressive state
As we are particularly concerned with nuclear proliferation it is 
important to note that some of the most powerful of images are associated 
with nuclear weapons These are widely regarded as political, not strategic 
devices instruments of terror which have been used by the strong to intim­
idate or destroy the weak They are still regarded as the weapon of the 
West against Asia, and a powerful feeling exists that their use against 
Japan was racist in motive Thus, there is strong support in South Asia for 
those who would eliminate or abolish nuclear weapons, just as there is m  the 
West and Japan
However, even though Indians and Pakistanis are sincere m  their 
denunciation of nuclear weapons, they are no less vulnerable than those m
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the West to the attractions of such devices Firstly, nuclear weapons 
(like nuclear power) seem to represent the highest level of scientific 
achievement, and peaceful nuclear programs m  India and Pakistan have received 
almost unquestioned support from political elites Nations which have 
nuclear weapons are feared, but they are also respected for their technical 
accomplishment Secondly, such weapons are seen as defensive m  character 
in the context of Indian or Pakistani possession Those who advocate 
the acquisition of an Indian or Pakistani bomb view this step as protective 
insurance, the legitimate response of a relatively weak power to the threat­
ening moves of neighbors or superpowers This is a popular view, although 
those who hold it have rarely explored the further strategic implications 
of nuclear possession Thirdly, as in the case of conventional weapons, 
nuclear cooperation between India or Pakistan and some outside power is 
seen as an important political and moral act this is so not only because of 
the strategic implications of such cooperation, but because it represents 
the transfer of a still-mysterious and awesome technology of destruction, 
and any such cooperation implies the closest political relations between two 
nations And such cooperation is not one sided in the case of India as it 
has entered into a number of agreements involving the transfer of nuclear 
technology to Iran, Vietnam, and other states Finally, nuclear weapons 
are seen to provide an opportunity to change the international political 
order India and Pakistan have been at war with each other on a number of 
occasions, and have fought larger or smaller wars with other neighbors as 
well, for them the post-World War II era has not been one of peace their 
elites generally do not regard nuclear weapons as likely to worsen the situation 
but rather may create the opportunity to favorably adjust their position m  
the hierarchy of nations— or at least prevent that position from slipping
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On balance, most Indian and Pakistani elites who have thought about the matter 
believe that the use of nuclear weapons is extreme but not inconceivable 
as long as they might be used by others (and here the others 1 can include 
almost all of the present nuclear powers plus any new nuclear states^ then 
prudence dictates that India and Pakistan themselves be able to acquire such 
devices We shall return to these arguments m  the next section but it is 
important to emphasize that Indian and Pakistani strategists are able to hold 
fundamentally contradictory images of nuclear weapons Such elites will 
agree that nuclear weapons are terrible instruments of mass destruction, and 
those that possess them seem bound to acquire more and more, well beyond 
any rational levels Yet, they will argue, these are all reasons which make 
it necessary to at least maintain the 'nuclear option" Non-nuclear states 
also have the right to protect themselves against their enemies, and superpower 
behavior indicates that in the case of nuclear weapons only the threat of 
nuclear retaliation is an adequate defense there will not be an arms race 
if India or Pakistan or both were to acquire nuclear weapons (many pro­
bomb people argue), because these states aure better able to judge what is 
necessary for their own security than the superpowers (Many Indians claim 
that their defense establishment is much more cost-effective than that of 
the U S  or the Soviet Union ) An outsider can point out inconsistencies 
and dangers in the nucleair policies of both India and Pakistan, but he or 
she must be prepared to acknowledge inconsistencies in the policies of the 
nucleaur-haves before any meaningful dialogue can taüce place with elites of
these two states
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PART II PROCESS, REACTIONS, POLICY
A Indian Public Opinion and Nuclear Weapons
One of the central conclusions of our broader study concerns the 
structure of public opinion on the nuclear issue 20 Briefly, a large number 
of groups support a nuclear weapons program to a greater or lesser degree 
for a variety of reasons A full list drawn up in 1965 included over 
twenty different arguments in favor of nuclear weapons There were almost 
as many arguments against an Indian nuclear weapon at that time, but these 
have dwindled in importance over the years What has occurred over a 
fifteen year period is that there are now very few groups or individuals 
who publicly oppose the development of an Indian nuclear military system 
under all circumstances Those that do oppose such a program for one reason 
or another tend to do so in the context of the ' nuclear option'
These two dozen arguments in favor of nuclear weapons overlapped, but 
they did include these major assertions India needed a nuclear weapon to 
meet the conventional military threat from Pakistan India needed it to meet 
the conventional and nuclear threat from China the cost of such a program 
would be well within Indian capabilities, it would be useful m  dealing 
with the superpowers, especially as India claimed a position of dominance 
within South Asia nuclear weapons would give India a better bargaining 
position in the search for real international disarmament such weapons 
would enhance the power of a central government which had lost its greatest 
supporter, Jawaharlal Nehru, vis a vis recalcitrant states, territories, 
and regions, nuclear weapons were "insurance" against some unforeseen and 
unfavorable political alignment against India (which indeed was to emerge 
with the evolution of close U S -Pakistani-Chinese ties) Other arguments 
included appeals to patriotism, nationalism, fear and the benefits of modern
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21technology A complete analysis of the Indian bomb debate clearly shows 
that it was a debate (in that both the question of what to do and why to do 
it were widely discussed) and would illuminate the complexity of the arguments 
on both (or, more properly, on several) sides of the issue
Finally, and this is a point which is of particular importance m  analyzing 
Indian positions on the issue of nuclear weapons, there is no exact correlation 
between institutional affiliation and policy preference The members of such 
groups as the military, the scientific community and the security bureaucrats—  
let alone the politicians— hold a wide range of opinion on many issues 
Often individuals and factions will form alliances across institutional 
boundaries on particular hardware or strategic choices As m  any other 
complex decision-making process broad institutional identifications can be 
made, but this often leads to the blurring of real and important differences 
within civilian bureaucracies, the armed forces, or the political community
B The Anatomy of an Option
The Indian national debate on nuclear policy led to the mis-named 
22nuclear option As many observers have pointed out, everything depends 
on the time required to exercise the option if it is a matter of minutes 
or hours then it is merely a subterfuge, if it is a question of days or 
weeks or months, it is ambiguous if it is months or years, it may not be 
a real alternative in the face of an immediate threat In short, a state 
can be prepared to move to a military nuclear program to counter long-term 
trends or short term threats, both capabilities may be options, and any 
arms control policy in South Asia must be able to differentiate between 
the two
Further, one must be able to distinguish between levels of nuclear 
capability should India exercise the nuclear option Although government
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officials publicly refuse to discuss the question, many private researchers, 
scholars, journalists, politicians, and officials (in off-the-record con­
versations) indicate that the preferred Indian nuclear system would be one 
capable of reaching China, impressing the superpowers, and overwhelming Pakistan 
They argue that anything less would not be sufficient, and claim that the 
present inability to mount a major effort is one of the best arguments m  
favor of stringing out the decision to go nuclear This is true, but 
recent events may force a reconsideration of this somewhat leisurely pace 
If Pakistan is approaching a nuclear test then (as we shall argue below) 
there would be enormous pressure to respond m  kind this response could 
take the form of renewed "peaceful'* testing or a declared military nuclear 
capability This would necessarily be a limited nuclear capability m  the 
context of India-Chinese relations although it would satisfy pressures to 
react to Pakistan India would at this point be in a very dangerous positior—  
as many of her strategists are aware It would be vulnerable to a Chinese 
attack and might have to turn to a cooperative nuclear power to expedite 
its weapons program Although there is no precedent elsewhere, there is 
some possibility that outside powers will encourage the nuclearization of 
South Asia to serve their own strategic interests— again, a point we will 
discuss at greater length below
If the nuclear option strategy is fuzzy in its implications for levels 
and types of nuclear weapons, it is also unclear as to incentives There 
really seem to be four variations on the nuclear option theme, and each held 
by one or more groups within India
1 The No Bomb Option
A number of politicians and some bureaucrats seem to have subscribed 
to the nuclear option in the hope of deferring the decision forever They
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oppose nuclear weapons, but will leave the question open m  order to pacify 
domestic hawks They also recognize that prestige does derive from the hint 
that a state has the capability of going nuclear the threat of doing so may 
also be useful against outside powers (e g India's claim that the option 
strategy forces the superpowers to think seriously about disarmament) 
finally, they may not wish to give the appearance of national inconsistency 
by publicly calling for the renunciation of the nuclear option after fifteen 
years of hedging
Many Indian Gandhians (including Morar}i Desai) favored the No Bomb 
Option and are opposed to nuclear weapons, but were unable to persuade 
any other important sector of public opinion In fact, their greatest 
disappointment was with a number of old line Congress Party members, some 
of whom were reknowned Gandhians, who have come to support Option 3 or 4 
below Among the Gandhian community in India there was a brief debate between 
those who invoked the Mahatma against nuclear weapons and those who pointed 
out that he did make concessions on the use of force in Kashmir, and certainly 
disapproved of cowardice in the face of a threat
Since 1964 the influence of the anti-nuclear Gandhians has declined, and 
Morar}i Desai represented a minority viewpoint not only among Indians but 
among the Gandhians
A few regional parties oppose an Indian nuclear program because they see 
it strengthening the hand of the Central government even further They are 
less concerned about external threats and India's international image than 
the balance of power between the state and the center The CPM has been 
particularly vocal in opposition to a nuclear weapon program
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A fourth group which subscribes to the No Bomb Option would include a 
small but influential section of the Foreign Service, and some of India's 
most thoughtful ijoumalists and writers Their position has been that India 
cannot hope to compete with China in a nuclear arms race for many years 
and to do so is unnecessary A link with the Soviet Union is adequate 
to deal with the Chinese nuclear threat and provides the time for a lengthy 
accretion of technology and weaponry They do not openly oppose nuclear 
weapons per se, but only argue that they are not likely to be cost-effective 
for the indefinite future An assumption of these individuals (for that is 
what they are, as they are scattered through the Indian elite) has been 
that no other serious nuclear threat presents itself to India Until 
quite recently they could dismiss the notion that Pakistan might acquire 
a nuclear capability, although a few opposed the 1974 Indian PNE on the 
grounds that it would encourage Pakistan
2 The Covert Option
A small number of Indians believe that a military nuclear program has 
been covertly developed, and a larger number believe that it should be In 
this Option a ma;jor weapons program is planned and scheduled for completion 
at some fixed date— when warheads, delivery systems, and political conditions 
are all suitable Senior Pakistani officials claim that India already has 
such a limited nuclear capability Maintaining a public stance of indecision 
and pretending that the option is yet to be exercised would be a sensible 
strategy for any government which had made a commitment to go nuclear 
It might keep the Chinese and Pakistanis guessing and would reassure those 
superpowers who wished to be optimistic about non-proliferation In the 
case of the Soviet Union, it would encourage them to maintain a security 
relationship which is predicated on the assumption that nuclear weapons are 
not available to India
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It is not inconceivable that such a decision had been reached by Indira 
Gandhi (and suspended but not reversed by Morar:i Desai) The resistance 
of the nuclear scientific comnunity to complete international inspection 
of Indian nuclear facilities raises the suspicion that there is something to 
hide they also seemed curiously contented with Morar:i Desai's position on 
nuclear weapons It may well be that these groups have a firm enough 
commitment from the "heavyweight” political leadership (such figures as 
Indira Gandhi, Jag:ivan Ram, Y B Chawan, and a younger group of Congress 
politicians who have been strongly pro-bomb, including K C Pant) so that 
they are not concerned about the the temporary public renunciation of a 
nuclear weapons program
a ^ew years ago the Jan Sangh openly favored nuclear weapons 
One consequence of their entry into the Janata coalition was a moderation of 
this public position, they were joined with politicians and parties who had 
strongly opposed nuclear weapons (Morar:i Desai, elements of Swatantra) 
or who preferred to defer the decision for some time Ironically, a prominent 
Jan Sanghi, Atal Behari Va:payee, became Foreign Minister and thus one of 
the chief spokesmen on nuclear issues The Jan Sangh like some of the 
Socialists, suppressed their position to avoid disrupting the coalitior 
Janata is now on the verge of disintegration and such groups may reassert 
their earlier public position
There is a broader lesson here As long as there is no serious external 
threat the facts of life within a coalition (whether it is an amalgam of 
different parties such as Janata, or an amalgam of factions as was the case of 
most of the Congress governments of the past) encourage both strongly pro- 
bomb and anti-bomb politicians to suppress their views Politicians out of 
or opposition tend to be much less restrained on security-related
issues
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3 The Triggering Option
This policy makes a bomb decision contingent upon one 
or more ma^or triggering events These might include a Pakistani nuclear 
program, the loss of superpower support in dealing with China, the active 
hostility of a superpower, renewed hostilities with China, or a dramatic 
new strategic opportunity (the possibility of a further breakup of Pakistan 
or of a close relationship with a major oil producing state) Every major 
turning point in the Chinese nuclear program or in international efforts at 
non-proliferation has led to a ma^or nuclear debate within India These 
debates were barely contained by Lai Bahadur Shastn, Indira Gandhi, and 
Morarji Desai In each case the Indian elite was swept by feelings of anxiety 
there was either a sense of falling behind an adversary (China), or of being 
forced to give in to an unjust and restrictive demand by the very superpowers 
who were a factor in India* s conventional defense position or its economy 
These emotions are very powerful, and would be particularly evident in the 
case of a Pakistani nuclear program or renewed conflict with China as we 
have noted in Part I, the Indian images of these two states would not permit 
a sympathetic interpretation of such actions
In the face of these events it is likely that the bureaucracy would 
remain calm but the political community would shift from a willingness to 
"wait and see" to a demand that something be done The later such events 
occurred (i e four years from now), the more likely a typical Indian government 
would be to initiate a military nuclear program, there is a small chance 
that if they occurred sooner— or could be contained by political or conventional 
military means— then no ma}or shift in policy would take place This is 
obviously a very hard calculation for me to make much would depend upon the 
inclination of the Prime Minister and a few key cabinet members the bureau-
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crats who have been predisposed to wait# or who have opposed the development 
of nuclear weapons would, I suspect, lose much of their standing on the decision 
to go nuclear unless the senior political leadership itself happened to be 
anti-bomb (which is most unlikely)
4 The Recalculation Option
The nuclear weapons decision can be also contingent upon some future 
recalculation of the economic, political, and military gains and losses 
associated with an Indian bomb The most important considerations would 
be the decline m  the unit cost of a weapon and sophisticated delivery 
system, a lessening of Indian vulnerability to superpower pressure or 
punishment, the mastery of relevant technologies, and the promulgation of 
new strategic doctrines which show a new or more efficient role for nuclear 
weapons (more rumble for a rupee)
The Recalculation option is the centrist, moderate, compromise position 
on the bomb within India It is held by a wide range of informed opinion, 
especially among civilian bureaucrats and in the military It is, m  effect, 
the Government of India's public position above all, it is vague and indefinite 
enough— pushing the decision off to some uncertain future date— to have 
received widespread support from individuals and groups who are m  fact 
personally committed to the No Bomb or Covert Options (#1 and 2)
The military and the defense bureaucracy (especially those officials 
concerned with defense production) have supported this variation of the nuclear 
option because of important strategic and organizational considerations 
For the military the Chinese nuclear device at Lop Nor came as a rude shock 
Their entire training and orientation had been m  the context of what was a 
World War II army the idea of nuclear weapons was militarily and organization­
ally disruptive But of greater concern to the military and their civilian 
bureaucratic counterparts in the Defense Ministry was the fear that a nuclear
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program would divert resources from the services modernization program
However, the military came to realize after 1974 that there was an increasing
possibility of an Indian nuclear force They turned to the study of nuclear
23strategy with considerably more interest One important development has been 
the idea of using a nuclear force as a lever on the government to extract 
more funds for conventional forces, especially for armor and thick skinned 
vehicles which could operate m  a nuclear environment In short, the attitude 
of the military has been opportunistic nuclear weapons will disrupt tra­
ditional organizational forms— but if they aure going to be developed then 
the services should control them and be helped to modernize those conventional 
forces which can best exploit the special chauractenstics of nuclear weapons
An enormous— and unresolved— problem is which service has the best 
claim over the control of nuclear weapons in India By denying the existence 
of a nuclear program the Government of India has been able to finesse 
this question, and the lack of evidence that it has been seriously discussed 
within the bureaucracy would seem to support the claim that India is sincere 
in its non-military intentions However, it may well be that neither the 
army or the IAF will be allowed to control such devices, especially if the 
objective of the Indian program is the development of sophisticated missiles 
If this turns out to be the case a separate service or force may be created 
by combining scientific personnel with officers drawn from all three aimed 
forces If, however, India is forced to develop a military program quickly 
then available aircraft would have to be used for delivery, and the IAF 
would have a clear lead over the army
Much of the foreign policy elite, including a number of recent critics 
of Indira Gandhi, support the Recalculation Option because it is seen as part 
of a broader foreign policy consensus developed from 1967 to 1972 The two
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other ma}or components of this consensus pertain to relations with Pakistan 
and the Soviet Union In the former case successive Indian governments 
have favored a step-by-step policy of reconciliation with Pakistan, moving 
slowly towards the "normalization" of relations between the two countries, 
but with no change in the status of Kashmir Essentially the policy is one 
of waiting out Pakistan and hopirg that the fervor for the recovery or 
self-determination of Kashmir dissipates The other important element m  
this Indian foreign policy consensus is a belief that the Soviet Union remains 
India's best friend among the superpowers It is the only superpower with 
major interests in the region and these interests (primarily China) coincide 
with those of India The Recalculation Option rests on a judgement that 
Pakistan would not or could not renew hostilities against India and that 
the Soviet Union would provide some informal nuclear umbrella vis a vis 
China
To summarize our analysis thus far the arguments in favor of going 
nuclear are quite persuasive to a number of Indians, regardless of what 
happens m  neighboring countries The centrist position— the Recalculation 
Option— favors a serious reconsideration of the entire nuclear program 
when the technology for a modem (i e strategic) delivery system is within 
reach However, if one or more of a number of dramatic events occurs before 
an Indian strategic system is available^ there might be a change in this 
policy (we will discuss the alternatives below) Finally, there are important 
groups in the country who formally subscribe to the Recalculation Option 
but in fact have made up their minds in favor of or m  opposition to a nuclear 
program The latter group would be decimated by the perception of a new 
nuclear threat from Pakistan or the renewal of conflict with China
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C Indian Reactions to the Pakistani Nuclear Program
As this is being written, Indian governments are falling with some 
regularity and elections have been announced for late 1979 One of the 
central arguments of this Report has been that there is a wide consensus 
on the development of nuclear weapons, and this consensus includes the 
"permanent government" consisting of the senior bureaucracy, the military, 
and the scientific community, supported by many defense intellectuals and 
journalists
Their influence would be substantial no matter who the Prime Minister was 
With a caretaker government, or a series of unstable governments, this 
influence is likely to increase For purposes of analysis below I have 
assumed that India will acquire a government of one sort or another 
It is likely to be a coalition in shape if not in name but m  this regard 
will not be very different from earlier Congress governments, the Janata, 
or even some years of Indira Gandhi's prime ministership
It is my judgement that most coalition governments would be able to make 
the major decisions discussed below— up to and including the decision to 
launch a military nuclear program It is not likely that this decision 
would be made in the absence of a government— i e , by the President, by 
a caretaker prime minister, or by the bureaucracy— unless a governmental 
crisis lasted beyond the next election The bureaucracy is most likely to 
continue along well-worn paths, waiting for a new political leadership 
This provides an unexpected opportunity for the U S  to prepare a broadly 
conceived strategy to control nuclear proliferation in South Asia
Considerable recent attention has been focussed on a Pakistan^, nuclear 
device, and subsequent Indian reactions to it This is only one of several
-37-
possibilities Such a device may or may not have an announced military purpose, 
or India may or may not choose to accept Pakistani assurances of its peaceful 
character Short of an actual explosion, Pakistan may move closer to an 
explosive capability, and/or develop delivery systems and command and control 
arrangements Finally, we have the present situation, some distance away 
from an explosive capability— and at least some hope of deferring or preventing 
such an event What would be the likely Indian reaction at each stage?
1 A Pakistani Nuclear Test
A Pakistani military test, or the declaration that a PNE shot was a 
military test, or even a declared PNE is most likely to lead to an all-out 
Indian nuclear effort, possibly forestalled temporarily by the need to con­
solidate programs and exploit the occassion for political purposes (the 
Covert Option, #2) Evidence that a test was about to take place would 
most certainly lead to the conversion of the Indian program to military 
purposes, i e the conversion of a Triggering Option into the Covert Option 
or an overt military program if the Government still favored Option 4 (the 
Recalculation Option) at this time it is likely that it would be swept away 
by such evidence As we have noted, the Recalculation Option is part of a 
broader consensus on foreign policy clear evidence of a Pakistani nuclear 
threat may persuade many Indians that a strategy of moderation and con­
ciliation towards Pakistan is useless
To summarize, a Pakistani nuclear device, or evidence that such a device 
was being fabricated, would be an event which no likely Indicai government 
could ignore, it would naturally be a boon for the pro-bomb nuclear strategists 
they are not worried about India's capability to keep well ahead of Pakistan 
and would urge that India go for a larger (50+) rather than a smaller (5-10) 
warhead force, using whatever delivery systems are available at the time
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time They think that such a balance would be stable and manageable 
the Pakistanis who are pro-bomb and who have thought about the problem 
(a very tiny group of people, indeed) also do not seem troubled by an Indian 
nuclear program, since they generally believe the Indians have a nuclear 
capability of under a dozen warheads right now, they do not think that going 
nuclear will lessen their security
Indians who have favored the No Bomb Option (#1) or the Recalculation 
Option (#4) would be most shocked by a Pakistani device They have built 
their caution around the belief that Pakistan was incapable of or not interested 
in a serious nuclear program this belief was shared by many outside 
observers, including this writer, until discussions with a variety of Pakistani 
elites and examination of relevant material indicated that not only civilians 
but some of the military had been persuaded that nuclear weapons could
24reinforce conventional military capabilities, and would not replace them 
It is interesting to speculate whether the military m  Pakistan night not 
have opposed nuclear weapons had Bhutto remained m  power and tried to acquire 
them at the cost of ties with traditional weapons suppliers
Those few Indian journalists, Foreign Service officers, and politicians 
who have hoped that deferring an Indian bomb would make it easier to reach 
a broader settlement with Pakistan will find their position indefensible they 
may now have to argue for moderation and caution m  exercising the Indian 
nuclear option, hoping that some arrangement can be worked out between the 
two new-nuclear states They may try to argue that a limited Indian nuclear 
capability would be adequate to deter or balance the Pakistanis I do not 
believe that they are likely to be successful without considerable assistarc*» 
from the Pakistanis themselves and restraint on the part of the major
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nuclear powers This does raise the possibility of serious disagreement among 
Indian decision-makers as to the meaning of "going nuclear " The Foreign 
Ministry would try to engage in damage limitation, portraying the Indian 
reaction as essentially defensive and reactive to an unnecessary Pakistani 
provocation, others, less interested m  good relations with Pakistan and more 
concerned about moving quickly to a position of equality with China (and who 
would like to imprint the idea of India as a great power on the broader world) 
would argue for an all-out crash effort regardless of the reaction of the 
superpowers As we have suggested the compromise between these two groups 
might be the Covert Option— an undeclared military program
While I believe it to be almost a certainty (on the order of 90% 
probability) that a Pakistani explosive program (whether or not it was 
designated as peaceful) would trigger an Indian military nuclear program,
1 do not believe that India would react by launching a "surgical” air strike
or even a ground attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities There are a number
of technical obstacles in the way— lack of Indian experience in daytime
penetration, target acquisition in the face of a hostile air force (even if
Pakistani radar is inadequate), the lack of suitable aircraft (at least until
the Jaguars are operated for some time) More important, the Indian Air
Force is not going to give an unqualified guarantee that it will be successful,
and that is what the politicians will ask for Finally, there is the danger
of retaliation on India*s own nuclear facilities and such vulnerable but
important sites as the rigs over the Bombay High However, a strike on
Pakistan's nuclear facilities would be more tempting during the course of
25a Fourth Indo-Pak war
2 Evidence of Nuclear Intentions
Evidence that Pakistan was moving quickly towards a nuclear explosive 
capability, or was perfecting its delivery and command and control arrangements
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is also not likely to lead to a direct Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear 
facilities It is more likely to push India into a Covert Option I cannot 
imagine any likely Indian government not authorizing full-scale R & D into 
military oriented technologies, but they might stop short of additional 
nuclear tests, depending upen the political context at the moment As long 
as India has same assurance that it remains ahead of Pakistan m  terms of 
nuclear capability it will try to place the onus of proliferation on Pakistan 
and then react with a far more sophisticated and larger program of its own
If the evidence of a Pakistani nuclear program was ambiguous or difficult 
to interpret, then the advice of the scientific community would be important 
This would be particularly true if the political leadership was new or 
untested However, the scientists are not a monolithic group Those who 
are involved m  the space and nuclear programs and who are also concerned 
about the military potential of the Indian proaram would be able to provide 
expert advice, but it might be regarded as tainted A larger number of 
distinguished scientists are affiliated with various conventional weapons 
development programs under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense, and a few 
are in advisory positions within the intelligence community and m  the 
Ministry of Defense Ce g R Ramanna) It may well be that expert interpre­
tation of ambiguous events will be inconsistent In this case the civilian 
intelligence community and senior IAS officers in the Defense Ministry will 
play at least an equal role in any decision made by the Government
3 A Stagnant Program
If Pakistan remains at its present level of nuclear development (which 
I assume to be several years away from a test explosion) there is some 
possibility that India will not develop a military nuclear program (which it 
could do row by converting its present capability into a "limited' nuclear 
force capable of strategic attacks on Pakistan and tactical defense against
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China) If a firm decision to have a military program has not been made 
already (Option 2), then the Recalculation Option will be maintained for several 
years This [judgement is based upon my understanding of opinion within
India the Recalculation Option not only represents a compromise between
hawks and doves but is the preferred position of the vast majority of 
strategists, civilians, generals, and others as long as the political and 
economic costs of going military-nuclear are high But as these costs are 
reduced in years to come (an Indian missile program, satellite reconnaissance, 
proliferation elsewhere, possibly even by Pakistan) the barriers to an 
Indian military-nuclear program will be successively eliminated Other 
things being equal, I think that India is more likely than not to be a 
military nuclear power of sorts by the end of the 80's A Pakistani device
will precipitate such an Indian program the absence of a Pakistani bomb is a 
necessary but not a sufficient cause m  preventing one from coming to 
fruition
D The Indian Response to Efforts to Contain Pakistan
There is another major variable in the Indian response to a low level 
Pakistani nuclear program the efforts of outside powers to control or contain 
a nuclear arms race in South Asia As we have implied>the Indian response to 
an advanced Pakistani nuclear program is not likely to be influenced by any 
other consideration It is doubtful whether much can be done to stop 
India in the face of a Pakistani PNE program, although an effort directed 
towards regional stabilization would be of great value
The Indian response to an outside effort to stop Pakistan from going 
nuclear to begin with is more problematic It depends on the nature of that 
effort Simplifying things somewhat, outside powers can (with reference to the 
proliferation issue) take a tough, a sympathetic, or a neutral stand toward 
Indian or Pakistani nuclear programs This gives a number of policy permu-
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tations, assuming superpower cooperation, more if the superpowers pursue 
different strategies
A tough stand against proliferation can lead to conventional security 
guarantees (e g the buyout option for Pakistan) An effort to keep Pakistan 
from going nuclear by supporting it m  this way would encourage rather than 
discourage an Indian nuclear program Almost all Indian politicians, 
military officers, and foreign service personnel came to political maturity 
during the years of the Ü S -Pakistani tie They believe that that tie 
was a manor cause of the wars of 1965, 1971, and may possibly contribute 
to future wars as well not a few Pakistanis, incidentally, now believe that 
their 0 S connection contributed to Pakistan's 1971 disaster These may 
be erroneous or exaggerated beliefs, but they are widely held any effort 
to buy out Pakistan would be very costly (because of Pakistan's suspicions) 
and would probably lead to an Indian nuclear effort, or at least a shortening 
of the option An American attempt to punish Pakistan to prevent it from 
going nuclear would ease pressure within India for a military nuclear program 
but it would not eliminate some of the basic arguments in its favor 
Pakistan seeks nuclear weapons to deal with India Indians who favor the bomb 
do so because of one or more of several reasons These include the threat 
from Pakistan, but also that from China, and (a point which is hard for 
Americans to grasp, but which I think is critical) because of a fear of hostile 
superpower involvement in the affairs of the region Being the weaker 
power, Pakistanis have encouraged outsiders to come m  and manage regional 
affairs being the stronger, Indians naturally do not
I think there is room for maneuver here (and will discuss this below) 
but the basic hostility of Indians towards outside efforts to manipulate 
or arrange regional affairs must be kept in mind If it were to be effective, 
an active, tough policy aimed at preventing Pakistan from going nuclear
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coup led with a studied disinterest in India's nuclear program (1 e , neither 
supporting India's nuclear ambitions nor actively crusading against them, 
roughly the consequences of our present policy) might be effective it would 
not hasten India's decision on a military program, but then it would not 
put it off to the distant future, either India would then know that 
the U S would be unlikely to reverse its policy towards Pakistan and 
support that state's proliferation (or pump military equipment into it)
The chief difficulty with this strategy is that it might not prevent Pakistan 
from acquiring a limited nuclear capacity by that time, however, the Indian 
government might well have made the decision to go nuclear itself at least 
in this scenario the U S would not be seen as having supported proliferation 
or as having directly opposed the ma^or regional power, India
E The Indian Response to Renewed Chinese Hostility
To a world that barely remembers the Sino-Indian war of 1962 the 
anxiety of the Indian elite vis a vis China seems bizarre, a relic of the 
Cold War For Indians, however, the Chinese are neither distant nor benign 
and Indian policy since 1963 has been consistent on this point The 1962 
war was India's equivalent of Pearl Harbor and Munich, and was especially traumati 
for the military For years a flow of memoirs, books, and studies have continued 
to raise controversy as to who was to blame for the debacle this remains a good 
measure of Indian feelings towards the threat from the North ^  Suspicion 
of the Chinese is also strong in many politicians (especially those from 
U P and Bihar) strategically, they see the Chinese as inevitably opposed 
to the rise of independent power centers on their periphery, and Indian 
sympathy towards Vietnam stems more from a shared wish to be recognized as 
regional great powers than from their ties with the Soviet Union
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Thus, Indians are predisposed to be sensitive to any military move by 
China Were China to reposition its nuclear forces to reach all parts of 
India, were it to strengthen its Tibetan garrison, or were it to renew 
its propaganda attacks very few Indians would be surprised None of these 
events are likely to trigger an Indian military nuclear program as long as 
the Indian military maintains its present high level of preparedness m  the 
Himalayas However, evidence of a renewal of systematic Chinese hostility, 
including expanded support to Pakistan might push India into a Covert 
Option program India would be reluctant to do anything which would lead 
to a distancing of the Soviet Union, and am overt Indiam nuclear program 
might have this effect But the closer India was to a complete nuclear program 
the less the Soviet Union would be a factor and we can conceive of a situation 
(discussed below) where the Soviet Union was maneuvered into active support 
of an Indiam nuclear system
F Chinese and Soviet Reactions to South Aslan Proliferation
There is a widespread belief that the Soviet Union strongly opposes 
regional proliferation They have been cooperative on the NPT and related 
efforts, amd have since 1964 consistently discouraged Indians from going 
nucleau: Their motives are clear most potential proliferators are states
close to the Soviet Un^on or the Soviet sphere of influence ard two of 
them— the Federal Republic of Germany and Japem— rank among the world's 
ma}or industrial powers Nuclear weapons in the hands of Islamic states 
on the Soviet's southern borders cam hardly be a welcome event, as much 
for internal as external reasons
Yet were India to decide to go ahead with a nuclear program it would be 
worthwhile for the Soviets to attempt to influence the targeting of Indian 
weapons so that Indiam militai power continued to serve Soviet interests 
vis a vis China The Soviets are likely to conclude that if the Indians
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cannot be 'bought out" then they may have to be supported m  their nuclear 
ambitions I would argue, therefore, that while the Soviet Union will remain 
cooperative on non-proliferation for some time, if Pakistan should go nuclear 
(and thus push the Indians into their own program sooner rather than later) 
there may be some selective weakening of Soviet restraint vis a vis the 
Indian nucleair program
This assumes that no major change occurs m  the Sino-Indian conflict 
Regional proliferation might well lead to adjustments m  Chinese and Indian 
attitudes towards their border dispute and the role that India has played 
in the Sino-Soviet dispute The Chinese may conclude that an Indian nuclear 
program provides them with the opportunity to wean the Indians away from the 
Soviet Union, for they will perceive the Indians as now fully self-reliant 
With a pair of reasonable governments the two states could work out a compro­
mise on their border conflict this would mean a major break m  the Indian 
policy of working closely with the Soviet Union, but would have been anticipated 
by the shock of going nuclear
G Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's response to an Indian nuclear program has apparantly been 
to seek a national nuclear capability of its own The question is not the 
intention of Pakistan, but the amenability of this or a future leadership to 
persuasion in two areas The first is, what it would take to keep Pakistan 
from exercising a nuclear option? The second is their interest m  adequate 
controls over a nuclear device should they decide that a bomb is necessary 
And, one might add, how can Pakistan be prevented from transferring or sharing 
it with another regional state (e g Bangladesh) or a non-regional state 
that might have some use for it?
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I think that the answer to the first question is, simply, a great deal 
of military equipment The military of Pakistan do not have any special 
interest in nuclear weapons and to my knowledge were not pressing Bhutto for 
it Like most other Indians and Pakistanis they regard it as a larger 
weapon there is no special moral feeling about nuclear weapons, but neither 
is there much interest m  them from a military point of view They are 
instruments of deterrence, not of compellence (to use Schelling's terminology) 
and while Pakistani generals feel that they might require a deterrent capability 
to prevent an Indian invasion of their territory, nuclear weapons alone 
will not get them what they want, i e Kashmir and domestic tranauillity 
However, a small nuclear force coupled with a modem military establishment 
might work for them They may calculate that if the Indians can be frozen 
from attacking and occupying Pakistan proper by the existence of Pakistani 
nuclear weapons (even if India has their own), then Pakistan can once again 
regain seme maneuverability m  small wars or insurrections m ,  for example, 
Kashmir And they may feel that the acquisition of nuclear devices may 
make it easier for them to obtain conventional weapons, which must still 
remain their highest priority
I will come back to the command and control problems later, but my 
view is that Pakistan can— and cannot— be trusted with nuclear weapons 
Its leadership has long since run out of alternatives and is likely to 
stagger from crisis to crisis for some time m  this, the army becomes decisive, 
and a 3unta (let alone a civilian government) that hopes to stay m  power 
will have to demonstrate to the officer corps that it is militarily effecti\e 
If India ceases its relatively generous policy towards Pakistan, if outside 
powers (including the U S ) become isolated from the Pakistani leadership, 
if internal politics remain unsettled, and if a number of other ifs" also
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occur, one can envision one general or another using or sharing nuclear 
weapons I think some of the upper leadership is living m  the past, and 
soft or conciliatory voices run the risk of treason m  a palace politics 
environment In short, the problem of Pakistan as a crazy state’ is not 
imminent but it is real
H Strategic Consequences
Assume for the moment that either Pakistan went nuclear or India went 
nuclear (militarily), or that both were to acquire a military nuclear capa­
bility What effect would this have on their relations, and on their relations 
with the major non-regional powers, especially China and the Soviet Union’
I am not confident of the ability of the two regional states to manage 
a_nuclear arms race without incident Without underestimating the substantial 
competence of the Indian government m  security-related issues, there are m  
fact very few Indians with knowledge about the use or consequences of nuclear 
weapons The one group with partial knowledge, the nuclear scientists, are 
not likely to have an operational role once such weapons are deployed if 
precedent elsewhere is relevant Pakistan presents a much greater problem 
m  this respect In neither state is there much understanding of the way 
in which nuclear weapons change political relations, and rather than settling 
down to a comfortable mutual deterrence relationship the two states might 
engage m  hysterical mis-estimates of the other's intentions and capabilities 
Even now in the area of conventional weaponry the Indian military has a 
grossly exaggerated and distorted picture of Pakistani capabilities and 
has virtually adopted a pre-emptive strategy their judgement m  a nuclear 
context might be no better As I shall argue below, the U S and other 
nuclear powers, even though ' tainted in such matters m  the eyes of non­
nuclear powers, can certainly play a useful role in instructing a fledgling
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nuclear India or Pakistan in the intricacies of mutual and/or assured 
destruction, command and control systems, fail-safe, etc
It is not clear vhat the nuclear hierarchy of South Asia will look
27like once proliferation has taken place Certainly, India will be able to 
retain an adequate lead over Pakistan, assuming no outside nuclear power 
becomes involved It is doubtful that Pakistan will be able to achieve 
anything but a regional first-strike capability India might aspire to a 
regional second-strike force composed of missiles, air-delivered weapons, 
and even a sea—based system such as the Regulus However, because of 
geography and politics, a regional second strike force (on the order of fifty 
weapons) would have important implications for nearby regional nuclear 
balances, especially that between the Soviet Union and China A Pakistani 
nuclear capability might reduce Chinese involvement in Pakistan's security 
problem, and hence lead to a further stabilization of Sino-Indian relations 
But China would be wary of India's Soviet connection and the Soviets might 
hope that they could subtract the Indian force from the Chinese force facing 
them, or m  some other way divert Chinese attention away rrom the U S S R  
itself I will discuss this below but one thing that seems certain
to me is that regional nuclear proliferation m  South Asia will not only have 
a demonstration effect m  other unstable regions but will become linked to 
the Sino-Soviet nuclear calculus Not only will India have a catalytic 
capability here, but Pakistan might also, at least when it came to the Sino- 
Indian conflict Further, exactly how this coupling of deterrent systems 
will occur is hard to predict When France and Britain acquired nuclear 
forces they were (in the eyes of Soviet strategists) merely added to the U S  's 
enormous capability they made no strategic impact because they were contained 
within an alliance context Indian and Pakistani proliferation would not be
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so contained, nor would it always be clear where their weapons would be 
targeted
I Policy Corridors The Gams and Losses of Abstention and Activism
It is easier to state what will not work than it is to offer guaranteed 
solutions to complex problems I am certain, for example, that if, in the 
name of halting nuclear proliferation the U S were to attempt to revive 
the alliance with Pakistan in anything approximating its earlier shape, 
then India will go nuclear— and Pakistan might well also, or else involve us 
in a difficult situation Supporting India makes more strategic sense, 
and if coupled with enough pressure on Pakistan may keep that state from 
going nuclear, but I do not believe that it would prevent India from acquiring 
nuclear weapons m  the long run India would not back down further from 
its present nuclear policy, it would not sign the NPT, it would not give 
up the nuclear option And, there remains the possibility that a desperate 
Pakistan will somehow contrive to assemble a bomb would India— by that time 
supported both by the U S S R and the U S A  — either go nuclear itself or 
attempt to dismantle Pakistani nuclear facilities? They might do both if 
they had superpower support This might be an acceptable course of events 
in terms of limiting or controlling nuclear proliferation, but it mioht also 
be the final blow to Pakistan's shaky integrity I am not sure that Pakistan 
is a strong enough state to withstand pressure from such a formidable 
combination of powers and remain intact
Two other strategies suggest themselves, however Each recognizes the 
fact that the motives for nuclear proliferation are different m  India and 
Pakistan, but in both cases are linked to long-standing— if not permanent—  
disputes In brief, India and Pakistan have genuine security problems (or, 
more appropriately, in-security problems), and aside from questions of status
and prestige, those who advocate the acquisition of nuclear weapons in both
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states usually do so out of a concern for their country's integrity Where 
the two strategies differ, however, is m  their estimate of the effectiveness 
of American policy m  dealing with these long-term security problems
A strategy of abstention assumes that the U S cannot (or will not) 
do much to influence events in the region Our credibility in India and 
Pakistan is quite limited when it comes to matters of security and military 
a^ airs pursuit of global goals we have treated these two states
as dependent variables for so many years that they are wary of any American 
-nitiative Thus, it might be best to continue to disassociate the U S 
from regional security problems so that when one or both states go nuclear 
we are seen neither to have failed nor to have encouraged proliferation 
The Soviet Union and China have more direct interests m  the region than we 
do but we cannot count on either to oppose proliferation should it be 
imminent Our other ties with India and Pakistan can be retained Aid and 
even limited military sales can continue but they should not be linked to 
nuclear 'events'* Obviously, we have an interest m  retarding or preventing 
P ^ l ^ ^ ^ t i o n  in South Asia, if only because of the example it would provide 
to other near-proliferators, but my judgement is that without an activist 
American involvement we can have only a marginal impact upon the policies 
of India and Pakistan An abstentionist policy recognizes this earlier 
rather than later, and tries to de-link America from events beyond our 
control— or our will to influence
An Activist policy assumes that America can not only have an impact on 
regional security problems, but enough of an impact so that proliferation 
decisions can be influenced It would attempt to deal with the genuine and 
legitimate security concerns of both states, but m  a manner different than 
the U S effort of the 50's and 60's At that time we were rightly criticized
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for supplying both sides of an arms race for the participants, their relations 
amounted to a zero-sum game, and any American support to one side was 
automatically thought to be harmful by the other There are still some who 
hold this view (especially in the military) but there is also a growing 
awareness on both sides that the security of each state depends m  part 
upon the security of the other Many Indians are aware that a stable 
Pakistan insulates it from events m  Iran and Afghanistan if Pakistan is 
too weak, it cannot be stable Pakistanis openly acknowledge their inferior 
military status and point out that India has become a guarantor of their 
security
If these attitudes persist, there is room for an outside initiative 
here During the Simla Summit there were informal conversations about 
various conventional sunns control measures Several hot-lines now exist 
between the two countries, there is some awareness of the need to avoid 
provocative or confusing troop movements, and during weapons-acquisition 
debates in India (especially the recent DPSA debate) there was clearly an 
awareness that weapons on one side influence the weapons mix on the other 
This is considerable progress from the days of "more is enough’ My point 
is that the U S might be able to serve as a facilitator of direct Indo- 
Pakistan discussions and arrangements to stabilize (not balance) their 
conventional arms relationship If this is successful it 1) removes some 
of the suspicion which is one of the ma^or incentives to go nuclear, and 
2) may lead to direct talks about mutual non-proliferation in South Asia, or 
at least controlled proliferation
If the U S (by itself, or in conjunction with other weapons suppliers) 
were to attempt to encourage such direct Indo-Pakistani talks over vital 
security issues it would run into several obstacles Firstly, we have very
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little standing in these matters m  India As in the case of Egypt we would 
have to buy our way in while still maintaining our ties with Pakistan and 
the Pakistan Army Secondly, such an intervention or involvement might not 
prevent nuclear proliferation so much as it would defer it, or make it less 
upsetting when it did occur As I have argued above the Indians are concerned 
about more than Pakistan when they think about nuclear weapons Part of the 
arrangement might be an American effort to persuade China to come to a 
settlement of the Sino-Indian territorial dispute in a way favorable to 
India This m  turn raises the question of continued Soviet support for
India Unless the U S could demonstrate that it was a useful and consistent
partner in the effort to settle these long-standing disputes, I am not sure 
whether any future Indian government will be willing to loosen the Soviet 
connection
One additional step, alluded to above, could make some difference m  
the rate and nature of nuclear proliferation m  South Asia, and can be taker 
whether or not the U S pursues an activist policy This is to sharpen 
the awareness of South Asians of the effects of nuclear weapons Most 
Indians and Pakistanis have a schizoid view of such weapons at one moment 
they regard them all as evil, destructive devices, which must be eliminated 
from the globe, at another they seem to believe that they are (to quote 
Jag^ivan Ram) "nuclear bullets' , simple extensions of conventional weaponry 
Indians refuse to discuss the problems of deterrence which would arise 
should they go nuclear, as they are true abolitionists Pakistanis want 
"only four or five weapons, and seem unaware of how vulnerable this would 
make them to a serious Indian program To return to an earlier theme, the 
U S should not encourage proliferation, but by attempting to discourage 
it we should not neglect the possibility that it will occur, and then the 
necessity for intelligent and rational command and control arrangements
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over such devices In brief, there is a clear need for a selective educational 
program, and this need not be interpreted as giving m  on proliferation
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